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Abstract 
 
New Zealand’s academic research assessment scheme, the Performance Based Research 
Fund (PBRF), was launched in 2002 with the stated objective of increasing research quality 
in the nation’s universities. Evaluation rounds were conducted in 2003, 2006 and 2012.  In 
this paper, we employ 22 different journal weighting schemes to generate output estimates of 
refereed journal paper and page production over three six year periods (1994-1999; 2000-
2005 and 2006-2011).  These time periods reflect a pre-PBRF environment, a mixed 
assessment period, and a pure PBRF research environment, respectively.   Our findings 
indicate that, on average, research productivity, defined in either paper or page terms, has 
increased since the introduction of the PBRF.  However, this outcome is due to a major 
increase in the quantity of papers and pages produced per capita that has more than off-set a 
decline in the quality of published outputs since the introduction of the PBRF.  In other 
words, our findings suggest that the PBRF has failed to achieve its stated goal of increasing 
average research quality, but it has resulted in substantial gains in productivity achieved via 
large increases in the quantity of refereed journal articles.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Nation- wide assessments of university-based research are now relatively common.   
Arguably the best known and most influential of such reviews is the U.K.’s Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE), first implemented in 1986.1  Since then many other nations 
have, or are actively developing, their own research assessment schemes (OECD, 2010).   In 
this paper we shall explore the impact of one such evaluation mechanism, New Zealand’s 
Performance Based Research Fund (PBRF), on publication activity in the nation’s university- 
based economics departments.   The stated objective of the PBRF was to improve the quality 
of research in the nation’s higher education sector,2 and this was to be achieved, in large part, 
through financial incentives.  More specifically, approximately 20 percent of the 
government’s total annual operating grant to universities was to be distributed through the 
PBRF scheme, with individual universities receiving 60 percent of the available funding 
based on their relative per capita research performance and their PBRF eligible, full-time 
equivalent staffing levels (TEC, 2002).  
 The PBRF was one of the recommendations of the Tertiary Education Advisory 
Commission in 2001 and the details of the process to be used were not known until late 2002 
(TEC, 2002).  The scheme required all academics to submit to a peer assessment of their 
research over the most recent six year period.  The funding implications of PBRF 
assessments for institutions were to be phased in over the period 2004- 2007.  The first 
evaluation was conducted in 2003, based on research over the period 1997-2002.  This was 
followed by a partial round in 2006, so called because all academics were given the option of 
opting out and using their 2003 grade as their 2006 result or being evaluated on their research 
output over the six year period starting on 1 January 2000.  The third PBRF round was 
undertaken in 2012, with all research output over the period 2006-2011 being subject, once 
again, to peer review.  At the time of writing, the 2012 results have not been released.   
 Before proceeding, we shall provide a brief outline of the PBRF evaluation scheme.3  
The PBRF is a mandatory, individually- based review of the research activities of all 
academics normally expected to undertake research.   Researchers are assigned to one of 12 
subject panels, and ultimately to one of 42 discipline categories, with grade assignments 
being made on the basis of peer assessment.   Individual academics submit evidence 
portfolios (EP) that describe Research Output (RO), Peer Esteem (PE) and Contributions to 
                                                            
1  The current version is known as the Research Excellence Framework (REF).   
 
2  References to desired improvements in research quality can be found in virtually all government 
documents outlining the scheme.  For example: ‘Cabinet has agreed that a Performance- Based 
Research Fund should be established to: increase the average quality of research’, (TEC, 2002, 
p.7); ‘..primarily about quality, not quantity’, TEC, 2011, p.104; and ‘.. encourage and reward 
research excellence’, TEC, 2003, p. vii..     
 
3  For a more extensive discussion of the current version of the scheme, see TEC, 2011.  Reviews 
and comments on the 2003 and 2006 versions of the PBRF can be found in Adams, 2008;  
Mathews and Sangster, 2009; Goldfinch, 2003; Boston, Mischewski and Smyth (2005); and in 
Bakker, Boston, Campbell and Smyth (2006). 
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the Research Environment (CRE).  In describing Research Output (RO), researchers can 
include up to 34 research outputs, and identify 4 which they will describe more fully.  It is 
important to note that research is broadly defined and covers areas such as refereed papers, 
conference papers, books and book chapters that have been produced over the six year 
evaluation period.  However, it is widely recognized that for most disciplines, including 
economics, refereed papers are the primary yard-stick used in the evaluation process.  
Evidence on Peer Esteem (PE) is based on accolades received during the evaluation period, 
such as research grants, awards and honours, citations generated by previously published 
work, journal editorships and the like.  Contributions to the Research Environment (CRE) 
include factors such as the researcher’s role in doctoral supervision, development of research 
groups and programmes, and administrative roles in the area of graduate education.  A 
researcher can refuse to submit an EP, but is then automatically given a score of zero.  The 
EP is reviewed by the relevant expert panel and integer grades are assigned using a 0-7 scale 
for each of RO, PE and CRE.  These numerical scores are then combined to give a Quality 
Evaluation (QE) score.  In determining the Quality Evaluation score, the RO score has a 
weight of 70% and the PE and CRE scores a weight of 15% each.      
 Individual assessments are used in two ways.  First, researchers are assigned to one of 
four categories: A, B, C and R (not active in research).  Although the letter grade received by 
each researcher is supposed to be confidential, it is widely perceived that this is not the case, 
especially since high achievers frequently make their success known for pecuniary and ego 
reasons.  At the discipline and institutional level, the letter grades are publicly available, and 
are frequently used in promotional material and in other forms of advertising by the 
‘winners’.  Second, the letter grades are converted to a numerical score: R (0), C (1), B (3) 
and A (5).  These scores are then doubled and are used to generate per capita scores for each 
discipline category for each university, and then aggregated across all categories to generate a 
per capita score for each university.  The results are used in two distinct ways:  first, as for 
letter grades, they are aggressively used by the leaders in each category in their marketing 
activities; and second, they are used, along with each university’s PBRF eligible, full-time 
equivalent staff numbers, to allocate 60 percent of the available PBRF funding.4     
 These details of the PBRF are essential in understanding the intended effects of the 
scheme.  For each individual academic the relevant peer-review panel has available to it 
information that can be used in assessing both the quality and quantity of the research 
undertaken.  Since the peer evaluation process is essentially a black-box it is difficult to judge 
the weight given to quality versus quantity or how quality is assessed in determining the RO 
score. 
 Research Output (RO) and Quality Evaluation (QE) assessments have been treated as 
research quality measures in much of the discussion and analysis of PBRF.  For example 
Smart (2008a) uses regression analysis to consider the determinants of research quality using 
the PBRF assessments for individual academics as the independent variable.  Cinlar and 
                                                            
4  The remaining 40 percent of PBRF funding is allocated as follows: 25 percent based on research 
degree completions, and 15 percent on external research funds attained.   
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Dowse (2008) use per capita scores in analysing the impact of PBRF in particular subject 
areas.  Smart (2008b) considers ‘Quality vs Impact’ by comparing the PBRF assessments of 
institutions in particular subject areas with citation results.  The impact of PBRF on research 
productivity across all sectors as a whole is studied in Smart (2009a) using ISI Web of 
Science (henceforth, ISI) refereed papers as a measure of research output.  This research 
supports the view that research productivity increased substantially following the introduction 
of PBRF.   
 This literature is not clear on the distinction between ‘quality’ and ‘output’.  Since 
research outputs are not homogeneous, information on the quality of research produced is 
normally combined with assessments of quality to produce measures of output.  Research 
productivity is then output per capita.   Assessments of quality are involved in the implicit 
evaluations of peer review panels, or are based on quality indicators such as journal 
weighting schemes and citation analysis.  In this sense the PBRF assessment of research is a 
measure of output and is referred to as a ‘Research Output (RO)’ score. 5, Determining 
‘quality’ would then normally involve an assessment of the quality per unit of research or 
perhaps a comparison of quality assessed output with a measure of the quantity of research.  
 Although the objective of the PBRF is to increase the quality of research, relatively little 
evidence is available on the impact of PBRF on quality compared with quantity.   The only 
paper that we are aware of that directly addresses this issue is Hodder and Hodder (2010).  
They studied the refereed paper output of three New Zealand business schools over the 2004-
2008 period.   The journal ranking scheme developed by the Australian Business Dean’s 
Council (ABDC) was employed to assess quality changes.  They summarize their findings as 
follows:  ‘While there are fluctuations in the proportion of articles in various grades of 
journals over the 2004- 2008 period, the overall tendency is towards more articles in journals 
of lower grades, i.e., the quantity of articles appears to be over-riding considerations of the 
quality of the journal’ (p. 900).  Indirect evidence on the quality issue is also provided  by 
two other papers.  Gibson, Tressler and Anderson (2008) use an academic labour market 
econometric model to show that the returns to quality declined and those to quantity 
increased in academic labour markets for economists following the introduction of PBRF up 
to the end of 2006.  However the longer term results are open to question given the limited 
timeframe considered.6   In Anderson, Smart and Tressler (2013) PBRF research output 
scores for individuals in Economics for the 2006 round are compared with research output 
measures using a variety of internationally recognised journal weighting schemes.  This work 
indicates that PBRF assessments reflect only a moderate weight on quality and are not 
consistent with ‘aggressive or high-powered’ quality weighting schemes. 
                                                            
5  PBRF terminology is not consistent here.  When RO, CRE and PE scores are combined the result 
is referred to as a ‘Quality Evaluation’ (QE) score, even though this is an assessment of overall 
research output or contribution. 
 
6  In a related paper Smart (2009b) uses PBRF Quality Evaluation (QE) scores  to consider the 
relationship between research quality and the probability of promotion for all those participating in 
the 2003 and 2006 rounds. 
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 In this paper a detailed dataset covering the research output of academic economists 
between 1994 and 2012 is used to directly address the quality versus quantity question.   To 
measure research we use a wide variety of alternative measures of output commonly used in 
the international literature on research evaluation.   This enables us to consider both the 
quantity of measured research and its assessed quality per publication.  In contrast to the 
above noted studies, we have access to publications over two PBRF rounds (2006 and 2012), 
and we employ a much broader range of alternative output measures allowing us to address 
the quality/quantity/productivity question in greater depth.  At this point we must stress that 
we have restricted our analysis to one component of research; that is, we have ignored 
conference papers, books, chapters in books and working papers.  However, the refereed 
article is widely employed in the economics literature as the primary measure of research 
success,7 and it is widely perceived that the PBRF economics evaluation panel operates in a 
manner consistent with this view.  Fortunately, we have access to both quantity and quality 
data with respect to refereed articles; therefore, we are able to generate estimates of 
productivity changes over the assessment period, and we can further disaggregate the results 
to reveal the role played by each variable.  For quantity estimates, we have defined 
economics-relevant articles to be those contained in the approximately 1300 journals listed in 
EconLit as at 17 July 2012. 
 Selecting a proxy for article quality is more difficult.  The economics literature abounds 
with journal ranking schemes, generally based on either adjusted or unadjusted citation 
counts.  The rationale for using such journal weighting schemes (JWS) as a surrogate for 
article quality is the widespread view that citations are the best available measure for 
assessing an article’s impact.  Although problematic, we make the normal leap of faith, and 
equate impact with quality.8  However, the JWS selection process is complicated by the fact 
that there are numerous journal weighting/ranking schemes, and most differ in several 
important ways.  For example, decisions must be made with respect to:  treatment of citations 
from multi-authored papers;  treatment of self- citations (accept or reject); selection of an 
appropriate citation database;  determination of an appropriate time period for the collection 
of cites;  the selection of the type and range of journals eligible to send and receive citations; 
and acceptance or rejection of the premise that all cites are of equal value; and, if they are not 
judged to be equal, how should cites be adjusted.  One can also utilize journal based 
weighting schemes that are based on perceptions of experts.  As above, perception schemes 
vary in many ways, but most importantly in the biases held by voters.  
 Before proceeding, we must address an obvious omission: our failure to include direct 
citation counts and derivatives therefrom such as the g and h index.  The reason is simple: the 
lag structure in economics (and, more generally, the social sciences) between acceptance of 
an article and the generation of a meaningful stream of citations is such that the results are 
unreliable in the context of an individual-based, six-year cycle, research assessment scheme  
                                                            
7  In fact, virtually all articles in the rankings literature in economics focus on refereed papers to the 
exclusion of all other forms for research, largely for pragmatic reasons (data availability) and for a 
belief that such output is of primary importance in tenure, promotion and hiring decisions. 
 
8  For a critique of this assumption, see Beed and Beed (1996).    
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(Tressler and Anderson, 2012).9  Therefore, for purposes of this study, the direct citation 
approach is rejected in favour of the indirect approach. 
 
2.  Data Sources 
In order to explore the quantity/quality issue in a rigorous fashion, we assembled three 
datasets covering all staff employed by New Zealand’s eight universities as at 2000, 2006 and 
2012.  For each reference period we collected publications generated over the preceding six 
years in order to replicate the assessment periods of the PBRF rounds of 2006 and 2012 
(2000-2005 and 2006-2011, respectively).  The dataset based on the year 2000 staff lists, 
covering publications over the period 1994-1999, provides us with information on the 
incentive structure facing New Zealand’s academic economists prior to public discussion of a 
PBRF-like research evaluation scheme.10  The first two staff lists were derived from 
university calendars, and the 2012 lists were obtained from departmental websites on 15 
April 2012.  For each staff member, publication lists were compiled primarily from the 
EconLit database, supplemented by reference to the Research Papers in Economics RePEc) 
database and individual CVs.  We followed the prevailing practice of allocating shares in 
multiple-authored papers on the basis of the 1/n rule, and adopted the same rule in allocating 
pages to individual authors.  We again followed convention, and adjusted page counts to 
reflect size variation by converting all pages into American Economic Review (AER) 
equivalents.11  Hence, we have two measures of output that we shall use throughout this 
paper:  share adjusted papers and share and size adjusted pages.12 
 We do not intend to suggest which journal weighting scheme (JWS) is best, but instead 
will use a large number of currently available measures to see if output changes are primarily 
due to quantity or quality factors, and also to see if the results differ across competing 
measures.    Since the JWS selection process is arbitrary, we employed twenty-two schemes 
                                                            
9  In another study, based on ISI data, Anderson and Tressler (2013) found that over a six year period 
52 percent of New Zealand economists received a ‘g’ and ’h’ score of zero, and 92 and 89 percent 
received ‘h’ and ‘g’ scores of two or less, respectively.    It is our view that these results fail to 
differentiate in a meaningful way between low and high producers. 
 
10  For purposes of this study, we have ignored the 2003 PBRF round.  Although the official scheme 
was not announced until late 2002, it was common knowledge from 1999 onwards that the 
government intended to move towards some form of research evaluation.  Hence, it is possible that 
some academics adjusted their behaviour accordingly.  However, the general view is that most 
academics were taken by surprise when the PBRF was announced (for example, see Hazledine and 
Kurniawan, 2005, p.173).  Nevertheless, we have chosen to adopt a conservative approach and 
create a dataset that precedes any possible behavioural change. 
 
11  We wish to thank Joseph Macri and the late Dependra Sinha for providing us page conversion 
factors for approximately 500 journals.  For all other journals, we used 0.72 as ratio of page size in 
‘other’ journals to an average AER page.  Gibson (2000) provides justification for this estimate. 
   
12  For a review of the conventional literature with respect to research measurement in economics, see 
Macri and Sinha (2006).  
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in an attempt to capture a wide range of factors (see Appendix 1 for a complete list and a 
brief outline of associated characteristics).  For example, we selected schemes based on the 
ISI, Scopus and RePEc databases.  We also selected schemes (using one of the three 
aforementioned databases) that are primarily based on simple impact factors (that rely heavily 
on the work of Garfield, 1972) and others based in large part on the recursive adjustment 
approach initially used in the journal ranking literature by Liebowitz and Palmer (1984).  It 
should also be noted that we also utilized four perception-based schemes and a base-line 
measure that grants equal weight to all journals and all articles and pages therein. 
 
3.  Results 
Let us now explore unadjusted research output changes over our three time periods (BASE 
(1994-1999), PBRF1 (2000-2005) and PBRF2 (2006-2011).  From Table 1 it can be seen that 
Unadjusted Papers/Capita increased by 78 percent from BASE to PBRF2.  The increase in 
share adjusted papers is somewhat lower at 32 percent indicating an increase in the number of 
authors per paper.  This is undoubtedly due, in part, to discipline wide trends, but may also be 
attributable to research management strategies to shift more staff from the non-active to the 
research active group (Hodder and Hodder, 2010).  Finally, from Table 1, note that un-
weighted, but share and size adjusted page output per capita increased by over 63 percent 
from the BASE period to PBRF2.  In summary, it is clear that from a productivity 
perspective, albeit with all paper and page output deemed to be of equal value, the PBRF 
programme appears to have been a success.   However, not everything else is equal in the 
publication realm, and to address this issue we shall now employ the previously referenced 
22 journal weighting schemes (JWS).   
 
Table 1: Ratio of Output Between Time Periods 
Various Categories 
 
Number  
of 
Papers 
Papers  
Per 
Capita 
Share  
Adjusted Papers 
Per Capita 
Size and Share 
Adjusted Pages Per 
Capita 
06-11: 94-99 2.08 1.78 1.32 1.63 
06-11: 00-05 1.40 1.41 1.35 1.66 
00-05: 94-99 1.48 1.26 0.98 0.98 
 
Table 2.  Ratio of Standardized Scores Between Various Time Periods 
Simple Average, 22 Journal Weighting Schemes 
 
Time Periods 
Adjusted 
Papers 
Per Capita 
Adjusted  
Pages  
Per Capita 
Score 
 Per Adjusted 
Paper 
Score  
Per Adjusted 
Page 
06-11: 94-99 109.27 131.72 82.68 81.02 
06-11: 00-05 95.08 113.83 83.91 85.79 
00-05: 94-99 114.54 114.98 98.20 93.84 
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 In constructing Table 2, the BASE period scores for all 22 JWS have been set at 100.0, 
and the output for other time periods adjusted accordingly.   The results presented in Table 2 
are the average scores across all 22 schemes.  First, note that on average, the number of share 
adjusted weighted papers (henceforth Adjusted Papers) per capita increased by 9 percent in 
PBRF2 relative to the BASE period.   This is in comparison to a 32 percent increase in un-
weighted, but share adjusted papers per capita.  The corresponding numbers for share and 
size adjusted weighted pages (henceforth Adjusted Pages) and un-weighted, share and size 
adjusted pages are 32 and 63 percent, respectively.  This suggests that much of the increase in 
output per capita between BASE and PBRF2 is due to a shift towards lower quality journals.  
Nevertheless, productivity, as measured in either Adjusted Papers or Adjusted Pages terms, 
has increased over the life of the PBRF, allowing one to argue that the PBRF scheme has 
been a success from an economic efficiency perspective.  However, the official objective of 
the PBRF is not to improve productivity, but to increase the quality of research.  Let us now 
turn our attention to this issue.    
 To measure quality, we now shift our yard stick from output per capita to score per paper 
and per page.  Once again, refer to Table 2.  Note that the average score per Adjusted Paper 
in period PBRF2 is only 83 percent of that prevailing in the BASE period.   Interestingly, the 
rate of decline in average score per Adjusted Page is even greater: from 100 in BASE, to 81 
in PBRF2.  In other words, the score associated with the average Adjusted Page declined by 
19 percent between BASE and PBRF2.  Therefore, our aggregate results suggest that the 
PBRF scheme has not raised quality, but has encouraged the publication of research in lesser 
ranked journals.   This may have resulted from the increased productivity of staff who 
typically publish in lower ranked journals, even though individual academics are encouraged 
to publish in better journals.  Alternatively, for some academics increasing the quantity of 
research output may have been an easier road to success than the pursuit of quality.  
 
Table 3.  Increases/Decreases in Scores Between Various Time Periods 
 
A. Change in Score from 94-99 to 06-11 for 22 Journal Weighting Schemes 
 
Adjusted Paper 
Per Capita 
Adjusted Page 
Per Capita 
Score Per 
Adjusted Paper 
Score Per 
Adjusted Page 
Decline 6 2 20 20 
No Change 0 0 1 1 
Rise 16 20 1 1 
B. Change in Score from 00-05 to 06-11 for 22 Journal Weighting Schemes 
 
Adjusted Paper 
Per Capita 
Adjusted Page 
Per Capita 
Score Per 
Adjusted Paper 
Score Per 
Adjusted Page 
Decline 1 2 12 19 
No Change 0 0 1 1 
Rise 21 20 9 2 
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 The above analysis has been based on the average scores over 22 JWS.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to ask if our results are dependent on the type of weighting scheme employed in 
the analysis.  As shown in Table 3,13 this does not appear to be the case.  From a productivity 
perspective, most, but not all JWS moved in the same direction for both Adjusted Paper and 
Adjusted Page measures.  More specifically, 16 of 22 schemes are associated with an 
increase in Adjusted Paper productivity between the 1994-1999 and 2006- 2011 periods.  
The corresponding figure for Adjusted Page productivity is 20 of 22.  Note that the change 
from PBRF1 to PBRF2 suggests that productivity has continued to increase over time: the 
corresponding estimates are 21 of 22 and 20 of 22 for Adjusted Paper and Adjusted Page 
estimates, respectively.  In summary, most, but not all JWS lead to the conclusion that 
productivity has increased during PBRF1 and, especially PBRF2, relative to the preceding six 
year period (BASE). 
 Let us now look at what the disaggregated results imply about the quality issue.  Once 
again, refer to Table 3.  Before proceeding, note that our EQUAL scheme will, by definition, 
indicate no change in quality over time.  The results are strongly supportive of the view that 
the PBRF scheme has failed to achieve its stated objective.  In fact, 20 of 21 schemes 
(excluding EQUAL) exhibited a decline in Adjusted Paper and Adjusted Page quality over 
the BASE-PBRF2 period.  Hence, the JWS selection process does not appear to be of great 
importance: virtually all journal weighting schemes lead to the same result: productivity has 
improved and quality has declined for both Adjusted Paper and Adjusted Page indicators 
under the PBRF regime. 
 However, reference to Appendix 2B does shed some light on the importance of the JWS 
selection process with respect to the productivity and quality issue.  Although admittedly 
arbitrary, we have grouped twenty of our twenty-two journal weighting schemes into three 
broad categories: those based in large part on recursive citation adjustment processes wherein 
the value of a citation depends upon the citing journal; those based in large part on simple 
impact factors, albeit, sometimes with adjustments to reflect sub-discipline citing habits, etc.., 
and schemes based on the perceptions of ‘experts’.  For purposes of discussion, we denote the 
groups as Recursive, Impact Factor and Perception Schemes.  Based on Recursive Schemes, 
productivity drops slightly when based on Adjusted Papers but rises by 15 percent for 
Adjusted Pages over the BASE to PBRF2 period.  However, the quality scores for both 
Adjusted Papers and Adjusted Pages decline by 27 and 29 percent, respectively.    On the 
other hand, the Impact Factor schemes yield quite different results:  the PBRF scheme would 
be judged to have led to a major increase in productivity, with the average increase being 23 
percent and 52 percent for Adjusted Papers and Adjusted Pages, respectively.  On average, 
quality scores based on Impact Factor Schemes also decrease over time, but much more 
modestly than under the Recursive Schemes.   
 Our third category, Perception Schemes, yields, on average, results that are roughly mid-
point between those associated with the Recursive and Impact Factor Schemes: productivity 
increases by roughly 15 percent and 38 percent for Adjusted Papers and Adjusted Pages, 
                                                            
13 See Appendix 2A for supporting information. 
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respectively between 1994-1999 (BASE) and 2006-2011 (PBRF2).  Corresponding figures 
for quality are -13 and -15 percent.  It should be noted that three members of the Perception 
Set (ESA, ERA and ABCD10) are Australian based.  Given the close ties between Australia 
and New Zealand, these schemes are the best proxies available for reflecting the importance 
of regional and national issues.   
 
4.  Policy Implications and Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that the PBRF’s stated objective of increasing research quality has not 
been achieved.  On the other hand, productivity, or output per capita, has improved from both 
an Adjusted Paper and Adjusted Page perspective, as the increase in quantity has more than 
compensated for the decline in quality.  It is important to note that we found these results to 
be relatively stable across the 22 journal weighting schemes employed in our analysis.   
 At this point we digress somewhat and address the following questions: why and how did 
productivity increase and quality decline during the PBRF regime.  The ‘why’ is subject to 
speculation, but it appears as if research managers and individual researchers were able to 
obtain enough information about the black-box used by the discipline assessment panel to 
realize that, at the very least, if everything else was equal, quantity mattered.  Hence, 
previously inactive staff were encouraged to produce some EconLit recognized output, since 
even a small amount of output was deemed to be sufficient to move such individuals from an 
R to a C, resulting in an increase in the unit’s per capita score.   In the 2006 evaluation 
65.34% of eligible staff in Economics were rated in the C, C(NE), R or R(NE) categories. 14  
In contrast only 6.9% of staff received an A while 38.35 were rated B.   Many of those who 
received a low rank in 2006 would have had few or no journal publications.   For these 
academics the best strategy for achieving an increased rank in 2012 was to increase the 
number of publications in relatively low-ranked journals rather than attempting a major 
increase in the quality of research, or publications in high quality journals.   Even for staff at 
higher ranks, maintaining or increasing research productivity at the prior quality level may 
have been a less risky strategy than aiming for a significant increase in the quality of 
research.   It is also possible that research managers recognized that some previously 
research- inactive staff were not likely to change their ways, and that some of these people 
should be encouraged to depart or be reclassified to non- assessed positions (read: teaching 
fellows and the like).  Once again, this action leads to an improvement in per capita scores.   
 Let us now look at the actual changes in staffing patterns over the 2000, 2006 and 2012 
periods to see if they align with the above mentioned score enhancing strategies.  From Table 
4, it is clear that the rank composition of the staff changed rather substantially over time, 
especially at the high (Professor) end.  In fact, the percentage of Professors doubled from 
                                                            
14  For the 2006 PBRF round, a new category for each of the C and R grades was added to reflect the 
fact that it was difficult for new and emerging scholars to compete successfully under the PBRF 
guidelines.  The new categories were labeled as C(NE) and R(NE), with NE standing for ‘new and 
emerging’. 
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2000 to 2012 (11 to 22 percent), and the percentage of Associate Professors also increased, 
albeit, at a more modest rate (from 16 to 19 percent).  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
proportion of Senior Lecturers and Lecturers declined from 50 and 23 percent to 40 and 19 
percent, respectively.  Given that higher ranked academics are expected to be more 
productive than lower ranked staff, this change should result in increased output per capita 
(everything else constant).   Although it is not clear why the resulting increase in per capita 
research output favoured quantity over quality, it is reasonable to suggest that hiring and 
promotion committees  perceived the PBRF reward system to be one that rewarded high 
quantity/good quality producers over low quantity/high quality producers.  We also suggested 
that one of the easiest ways for research administrators to increase absolute scores was to 
move non-producers to the active researcher category (expected to change letter grades from 
R (not research active) to C (acceptable).  According to our databases, the proportion of 
academic staff that can be defined as research active (those individuals publishing at least one 
paper, in whole or in part, over a six year period in an EconLit listed journal) increased from 
71 percent in BASE (1994- 1999) to 79 percent in PBRF1 (2000- 2005) and 83 percent in 
PBRF2 (2006-2011). 
 
Table 4.  Economists, New Zealand Universities, Percent by Rank 
 
Year 
Rank 2000 2006 2012 
Professor 11.1 18.2 21.9 
Associate Professor 16.2 14.6 19.0 
Senior Lecturer 49.6 45.3 40.1 
Lecturer 23.1 21.9 19.0 
 
 
 In our opinion, the above noted outcomes are consistent with the design characteristics of 
the PBRF.  The scheme is based on a productivity framework:  the unit of account is research 
output per capita.  Therefore, even if the discipline assessment groups favour quality 
(however defined) over quantity, it is reasonable to expect that if everything else is equal, 
increased quantity will result in a higher score.  This seems to be the prevailing view of how 
the peer review ‘black box’ operates.  It has led research managers to change the composition 
of their work force to employ more PBRF-friendly researchers, and has also led to efforts to 
improve the productivity of previously low or non-producers on the premise that some output 
is better than no output, and that some research output invariably leads to a movement away 
from the dreaded R classification.     
 In conclusion, our findings suggest that the PBRF scheme has failed to achieve its 
intended effect (increased quality); however, it has generated a socially worthwhile 
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unintended effect (increased productivity).15  It should be noted that our results are derived 
from a comprehensive database – 100 percent coverage of academic staff at the three census 
dates and, for each researcher, an assessment of all publications in EconLit listed journals.  
However, we must qualify our findings in three ways.   First, our work has undoubtedly been 
aided by the fact that New Zealand is a small country with only eight university-based 
economics departments.    Second, our work has addressed only one of forty-two discipline 
groups covered by PBRF, and it is possible that economics may not be representative of all or 
even most disciplines.  Finally, our results are obviously scheme-specific, and should not be 
interpreted to imply that research assessment schemes, in general, are biased against quality 
improvements.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Description of Journal Weighting Schemes 
 
1) LP84.  Source: Liebowitz and Palmer (1984.  Database: ISI.  Time Period: 1980 cites 
to articles published 1975-1979.  Number of Journals: 108.  Methodology: Recursive 
Adjustment. 
 
2) LP94.  Source: Laband and Piette (1994).  Database: ISI. Time period: 1990 cites to 
articles published 1985-1989.  Number of Journals: 130.  Methodology: Recursive 
Adjustment. 
 
3) KMS2003.  Source: Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003).  Database: ISI.  
Time Period: 1998 cites to articles published 1994-1998.  Number of Journals: 143.  
Methodology: Recursive Adjustment.   
 
4) KMS2010.   Source:  Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2010).  This working 
paper, with journal rankings, but minus absolute scores, was ultimately published, 
under the same title, in 2011 in the Canadian Journal of Economics 44(4): 1525-1538.  
Database: ISI. Time Period: average of citation counts to selected journals for 
preceding 10 years, starting in 2003 and continuing to 2008.  Number of Journals: 209.  
Methodology: Recursive Adjustment. 
 
5) KYEI.  Source:  Kodrzycki and Yu (2006).   Database: ISI.  Time Period: 2003 ISI 
citation data for papers published over the period 1996- 2003.  Number of Journals: 
181.  Methodology: Recursive Adjustment with modification for sub-discipline 
reference intensity. 
 
6) KYOI.  Source: same as for KYEI above.  Description same as for KYEI with one 
exception: citations collected from all Social Science journals in the ISI database to 
selected economics journals.   
 
7) KYPI.  Source: same as for KYEI above.  Description same as for KYEI with one 
exception: citations counts restricted to those from an arbitrarily defined set of policy 
journals.  
 
8) CLd.  Source: Combes and Linnemer (2010).   Database: ISI, Google Scholar and 
EconLit.  Time Period:  2005, 2006 and 2007 for articles published in the preceding 5 
years.  Number of Journals: 1168.  Methodology:  Various- including simple impact 
factors, field of specialization normalized indexes and h-index.  Under the CLd scheme, 
all 1168 journals are assigned to six groups with weights ranking from 100 to 3.125. 
 
9) CLm.  Source: same as CLd above.  CLm differs from CLd in that journal values are 
adjusted to reflect a medium degree of convexity. 
 
10) CLh.  Source: same as CLd above.  CLh differs from CLd in that journal values are 
adjusted to reflect a high degree of convexity. 
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11) Gibson.  Source:  Gibson (2000).   Database:  author constructed, primarily from 
EconLit.  Time Period:  i) 1996- 1998; and ii) life-time EconLit publications of selected 
researchers.  Number of Journals: explicit weights for 71 journals; all other EconLit 
listed journals received an equal, non-zero equal to 1/20th of top journals.  
Methodology: Econometric (Ordered Logit).   
 
12) CoupeIF.  Coupe (2003).   Complete set of weights obtained from: 
http//homepages.ulb.ac.be/~tcoupe/update/journals.html (downloaded on 20 August 
2007).  Database: ISI.  Time Period: 1994- 2000.  Number of Journals: 273.  
Methodology: Simple Impact Factor (average of 2 year Impact Factors from 1994 to 
2000). 
 
13) Bauwens.  Bauwens (1998).   Database:  EconLit and ISI.  Time Period: 1996.  
Number of Journals: 617.  Methodology: Simple Impact Factor- average of short-term 
(2 Year) and long-term (life-time of journal). 
 
14) Scopus SJR.  Source: Scopus/Economics, Econometrics and Finance Journal List, SJR- 
SCImago Journal Rank, www-scopus-com.  Downloaded 17-19 October 2012.  
Database: Scopus.  Number of Journals: +/- 950 (Economics and Finance).  
Methodology:  Impact Factor, with adjustment for importance of citing journal. 
 
15) Scopus SNID.  Source: same as Scopus SJR above. SNID- Source Normalized Impact 
per Paper.  Database: Scopus.  Number of Journals: +/- 950 (Economics and Finance).  
Methodology: Impact Factor, with adjustment for reference intensity across and within 
disciplinary groups. 
 
16) RePEcsif.  Source: Research Papers in Economics (RePEc), IDEAS/RePEc Simple 
Impact Factors for Journals, www.ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.simple.html, 
downloaded on 6 May 2012.  Database: ISI.  Time Period: life time of journal.  Number 
of Journals: 984.  Methodology: Simple Impact Factor. 
 
17) JCRIF11.  Source: ISI Web of Knowledge, Journal Citation Reports (2011), Impact 
Factor (2 Year).  Downloaded on 8 October 2012. Database: ISI.  Time Period: 2010 
cites to articles published 2008-2009.  Number of Journals: 321.  Methodology: Simple 
Impact Factor. 
 
18) MSF.  Source: Mason, Steagall and Fabritius (1997).   Database: Author conducted 
survey.  Time Period: 1992- 1993.  Number of Journals: 142.  Methodology: 
Perceptions of respondents. 
 
19) ESA.  Source: Abelson (2009).   For itemized rankings, see:  
http://www.ecosoc.org.au/cc/publications/. (Valid at time article published).  Database: 
Survey conducted by the Economic Society of Australia.  Time Period: 2007.  Number 
of Journals: 890.  Methodology: Perceptions of respondents. 
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20) ERA.  Source:  Excellence for Research in Australia, 2010 Final Journal Rankings, 
www.arc.gov.au/era. For a more user friendly presentation journal rankings, see John 
Lamp, Deakin University: http://lamp.infosys.deakin.edu.au/era.  Downloaded on 9 
March 2010.  Database:  Unknown.  Time Period:  2010.  Number of Journals:  640 
(Economics).  Methodology: Perceptions of Committee Members (supported by 
submissions also based on perceptions).  
 
21) ABDC10.  Source: Australian Business Deans Council Journal Quality List (2010).  
www.abdc.edu.au, downloaded on 12 October 2012.  Database:  Unknown.  Time 
Period: 2010.  Number of Journals: 907 (Economics).  Methodology: Perceptions of 
Committee Members (supported by submissions, also based on perceptions). 
 
22) EQUAL.  All journals listed in EconLit (as at 17 July 2012), and articles and pages 
therein, are deemed to be of equal value.  Number of Journals: +/- 1300. 
 
  
19 
 
Appendix 2A 
 
Comparison of Standardized Scores, 06-11 relative to 94-99 
(94-99 Scores Set to 100.0) 
 
Journal Weighting 
Scheme 
Adjusted Papers/ 
Capita 
Adjusted Pages/ 
Capita 
 Score/ 
Adjusted 
Paper 
Score/ 
Adjusted 
Page 
LP84 82.36 104.71 62.31 64.44 
LP94 68.75 73.81 52.00 45.33 
KMS2003 77.25 82.97 58.48 50.93 
KMS2010 86.54 104.27 65.38 64.10 
KYEI 101.70 125.33 77.02 77.14 
KYOI 102.72 126.46 77.82 77.80 
KYPI 115.34 143.08 87.32 88.01 
CLd 114.57 138.98 86.68 85.37 
CLm 116.82 138.26 88.40 84.93 
CLh 96.43 111.35 72.96 68.43 
Gibson 110.27 122.34 81.42 76.28 
CoupeIF 112.07 136.87 86.51 84.17 
Bauwens 117.63 141.07 88.84 86.49 
Scopus SJR 123.74 150.67 94.04 92.60 
Scopus SNID 129.68 159.83 97.54 98.47 
RePEcsif 122.40 156.08 92.47 95.90 
JCRIF11 135.26 165.02 103.38 101.97 
MSF 98.53 118.68 74.20 72.68 
ESA 122.14 147.22 92.53 90.40 
ERA 124.91 150.32 94.56 92.27 
ABDC10 112.39 137.83 85.08 84.76 
EQUAL 132.37 162.76 100.00 100.00 
Average 109.27 131.72 82.68 81.02 
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Appendix 2B 
 
Average Score by Methodological Grouping  
 
RAS Category: Recursive Adjustment 
 
Journal 
Weighting 
Scheme 
Adjusted 
Papers Per 
Capita 
Adjusted 
Pages Per 
Capita 
Score  Per 
Adjusted 
Paper 
Score Per 
Adjusted 
Page 
LP84 82.36 104.71 62.31 64.44 
LP94 68.75 73.81 52.00 45.33 
KMS2003 77.25 82.97 58.48 50.93 
KMS2010 86.54 104.27 65.38 64.10 
KYEI 101.70 125.33 77.02 77.14 
KYOI 102.72 126.46 77.82 77.80 
KYPI 115.34 143.08 87.32 88.01 
CLd 114.57 138.98 86.68 85.37 
CLm 116.82 138.26 88.40 84.93 
CLh 96.43 111.35 72.96 68.43 
Average 96.25 114.92 72.84 70.65 
 
 
RAS Category: Impact Factor 
 
Journal 
Weighting 
Scheme 
Adjusted 
Papers Per 
Capita 
Adjusted 
Pages Per 
Capita 
Score Per 
Adjusted 
Paper 
Score  Per 
Adjusted 
Page 
CoupeIF 112.07 136.87 86.51 84.17 
Bauwens 117.63 141.07 88.84 86.49 
Scopus SJR 123.74 150.67 94.04 92.60 
Scopus SNID 129.68 159.83 97.54 98.47 
RePEcsif 122.40 156.08 92.47 95.90 
JCRIF11 135.26 165.02 103.38 101.97 
Average 123.46 151.59 93.80 93.27 
 
 
RAS Category: Perception  
 
Journal 
Weighting 
Scheme 
Adjusted 
Papers Per 
Capita 
Adjusted 
Pages Per 
Capita 
Score Per 
Adjusted 
Paper 
Score Per 
Adjusted 
Page 
MSF 98.53 118.68 74.20 72.68 
ESA 122.14 147.22 92.53 90.40 
ERA 124.91 150.32 94.56 92.27 
ABDC10 112.39 137.83 85.08 84.76 
Average 114.49 138.51 86.59 85.03 
 
